





in this paper, i apply a difference-in-difference estimator to examine the impact of the merger 
between Iberia, Clickair and Vueling on route flight frequency, which is considered to be the 
main attribute of quality in the sector. Controlling for different indicators of competition and 
several route attributes, I show that the merger has implied a decrease in route flight frequency 
but the magnitude of this effect is modest. a plausible explanation of my result is a more collusive 
behavior of airlines offering flights in the routes affected by the merger.
Keywords: airlines, merger, competition, flight frequency, difference-in-difference estimator.
JEL classification: L93, D43, L4.
resumen
en este artículo se aplica un estimador de diferencias en diferencias para examinar el impacto 
de la fusión entre iberia, Clickair y Vueling en la frecuencia de vuelos a nivel de ruta, que está 
considerado como el principal atributo de calidad en el sector. Controlando por diferentes in- 
dicadores de competencia y varios atributos a nivel de ruta, muestro que la fusión ha supuesto 
una disminución de la frecuencia de la ruta de vuelo, pero la magnitud de este efecto es modesto. 
una explicación plausible de mi resultado es un comportamiento más colusivo de las compañías 
aéreas que ofrecen vuelos en las rutas afectadas por la fusión.
Palabras clave: aerolíneas, fusiones, competencia, frecuencia de vuelos, estimador de dife- 
rencias en diferencias.






the	 increasing	 presence	 of	 leading	 low-cost	 airlines	 like	Ryanair	 or	Easyjet	 have	
spur	price	rivalry1.	Note	also	that	some	steps	have	been	done	towards	a	liberalization	














The	 merger	 between	 Iberia	 and	 British	 Airways	 has	 not	 had	 an	 impact	 on	





















































and	Round,	2009;	Dobson	and	Piga,	2013)	but	 there	 is	scarce	evidence	about	 the	
impact	of	mergers	on	frequencies.	Only	the	works	of	Bilotkach	(2011),	Borenstein	
(1990),	 Fageda	 and	Perdiguero	 (2014),	Richard	 (2003)	 and	Werden	et al.	 (1991)	
have	provided	empirical	analysis	of	the	mergers	on	frequencies.
The	 remaining	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 second	 section,	 I	
provide	some	details	and	related	references	of	the	merger	examined.	Then,	I	specify	
the	 empirical	 model	 and	 state	 my	 expectations	 for	 each	 explanatory	 variable.	
The	 following	section	 reports	 the	 regression	 results.	The	 last	 section	contains	 the	
concluding	remarks.




in	 the	airport	of	Barcelona-El	Prat.	 Iberia	had	a	20	per	cent	stake	 in	Clickair	and	



































prices	 substantially	 after	 the	merger	was	complete.	Thus,	 the	war	prices	between	
Clickair	and	Vueling	was	followed	by	a	substantial	increase	of	prices	once	Vueling	
was	 integrated	 in	 Iberia’s	 group.	 It	 is	 not	 unreasonable	 to	 state	 that	 Iberia	 was	





between	 Iberia,	Clickair	 and	Vueling	 that	 is	 closely	 related	with	 this	 study.	They	
examine	 the	 impact	on	prices	and	frequencies	of	 this	merger.	They	find	a	modest	
3	 Recently,	 IAG	 (which	 it	 is	 the	 financial	 holding	 controlling	 Iberia	 and	 British	Airways)	 took	 the	
remaining	capital	of	Vueling.
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to	 the	 summer	of	2011,	considering	 the	 summer	of	2009	 the	period	 in	which	 the	




The	 empirical	 analysis	 in	 this	 study	 uses	 189	 routes	 including	 domestic	 and	
international	routes.	Hence,	I	can	analyze	whether	the	impact	of	the	merger	has	been	
stronger	in	domestic	or	international	routes	and	I	can	control	for	new	variables	like	










effective.	However,	my	focus	here	 is	on	 the	 impact	of	 the	mergers	on	passengers	
(in	 terms	of	flight	 frequency)	 and	not	 on	 the	behavior	 of	 the	 airlines	 in	 different	
scenarios.	
I	also	make	a	stricter	separation	between	the	routes	affected	or	not	affected	by	
the	merger.	 I	 consider	 that	 the	 routes	 affected	 by	 the	merger	 are	 those	 routes	 in	
which	Vueling	was	competing	with	Clickair	or	 Iberia	both	 in	200	and	2007	and	
the	 routes	 not	 affected	 by	 the	merger	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 those	 where	Vueling	
was	not	competing	with	any	of	 the	other	airlines	neither	 in	200	nor	2007.	So,	 I	
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drop	 those	 routes	where	Vueling	was	competing	with	any	of	 the	other	airlines	 in	
2006	or	2007	because	these	routes	cannot	be	strictly	classified	as	routes	affected	by	
(or	not)	competition	between	the	airlines	involved	later	in	the	merger.	Concerning	
the	routes	affected	by	 the	merger,	 I	can	examine	 the	 impact	of	 the	merger	 in	 two	
clearly	different	scenarios:	1)	In	 the	period	previous	 to	 the	negotiation	of	merger,	
competition	between	the	airlines	involved	in	the	operation	was	intense	in	the	routes	
in	which	they	were	offering	simultaneously	services,	2)	in	the	period	after	the	merger	






Overall,	 I	have	been	able	 to	collect	complete	data	for	189	routes	for	 the	years	
200,	2007,	2010	and	2011	so	that	my	sample	contains	75	observations.	The	routes	
considered	have	Barcelona,	 Ibiza,	Madrid	or	Sevilla	 as	 origin	 airports.	The	main	
operating	base	of	both	Clickair	 and	Vueling	was	Barcelona	but	Vueling	also	had	
a	 relevant	presence	 in	Madrid,	 Ibiza	and	Sevilla.	The	destination	airports	are	any	
airport	 located	 in	 the	 European	 Union.	 In	 this	 regard,	 I	 exclude	 intercontinental	















4	 The	 exception	 is	 the	 route	Madrid-Barcelona	 where	 both	Vueling	 and	 Iberia	 are	 offering	 services	
although	most	of	flights	of	Iberia	are	operated	as	a	shuttle	air	service.
					AN	EMPIRICAL	ASSESSMENT	OF	THE	MERGER	BETWEEN	IBERIA,	CLICKAIR	AND	VUELING	 83
In	 this	 equation,	 the	 dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 total	 number	 of	 annual	 flights	
offered	by	airlines	on	route	k	in	year	t.	As	explanatory	variables,	I	include	variables	















routes	 and	 another	 that	 identify	 tourist	 routes.	 By	 tourist	 routes,	 I	 mean	 routes	
















simultaneously	with	Clickair	 or	 Iberia	 in	 the	 years	 previous	 to	 the	merger	 (200	
and	2007).	This	variable	reflects	the	frequencies	offered	on	those	routes	affected	by	
the	merger	in	relation	to	those	that	remain	unaffected.	The	variable	Diff-in-Diff is	


























connecting	 the	30	biggest	Brazilian	airports,	 including	as	 explanatory	variables	a	
dummy	for	those	routes	in	which	Gol	is	offering	flights.	They	found	positive	effects	
of	low-cost	entry	on	major	carrier’s	capacity.	
Airline	 frequency	 data	 at	 the	 route	 level	 have	 been	 obtained	 from	RDC	 aviation	
(Capstats	statistics),	while	route	distance	data	are	taken	from	the	Official	Airline	Guide	
(OAG).	Population	and	income	per	capita	data	refer	to	the	NUTS	3	regions	(“provincias”)	






































Table	 4	 shows	 the	 test	 for	 mean	 differences	 for	 the	 most	 relevant	 variables	
in	 our	 analysis	 in	 the	 period	 before	 and	 after	 the	 merger;	 flight	 frequency	 and	
competition	variables.	Regarding	the	routes	affected	by	the	merger,	the	descriptive	
statistics	 suggest	 a	modest	 increase	 in	 concentration	while	 the	 share	 of	 low-cost	
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES uSED 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 dummy	 variable	 for	 routes	 in	 which	 air	
services	are	offered	from	secondary	airports	 is	positive	 in	all	 regressions	but	 it	 is	
only	statistically	significant	in	the	regression	that	uses	ordinary	least	squares.	While	
demand	 in	 these	 routes	 may	 be	 higher	 than	 predicted	 by	 the	 other	 explanatory	
variables,	 its	 statistical	 significance	 is	 conditioned	 upon	 the	 estimation	 method	
used.	
The	 coefficient	 of	 the	 dummy	 variable	 for	 tourist	 routes	 is	 not	 significant	 in	
any	regression	so	 that	we	do	not	find	a	differential	effect	 for	 tourist	 routes	 in	 the	
frequency	choices	of	airlines.	On	the	contrary,	the	coefficient	of	the	dummy	variable	

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in	all	 regressions	although	 it	 is	not	 statistically	significant	when	 the	estimation	 is	
made	using	the	ordinary	least	squares.	Note	that	the	economic	situation	was	worse	in	
the	period	after	the	merger	so	that	this	explains	the	negative	sign	of	this	coefficient.	



















Table	 	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 estimates	 of	 the	 frequency	 equation	 for	 different	
subsamples.	 Here	 I	 only	 report	 results	 for	 the	 difference-in-difference	 estimator	
as	 it	 is	 the	main	focus	of	 the	analysis.	First,	 I	consider	 routes	 that	 just	depart	 from	
Madrid	 or	 Barcelona	 airport	 (I	 do	 not	 have	 enough	 observations	 to	make	 specific	
regressions	 for	 routes	 departing	 just	 from	 Ibiza	 or	Valencia).	Then,	 I	 consider	 just	
domestic	 or	 international	 routes.	 The	 difference-in-difference	 estimator	 is	 negative	
in	all	regressions	for	all	subsamples.	In	the	case	of	routes	that	have	Madrid	airport,	
the	coefficient	is	statistically	significant	at	the	10	per	cent	level	in	all	regressions.	In	
routes	departing	 from	Barcelona	airport,	 the	coefficient	of	 the	variable	 is	generally	
statistically	significant	at	the	5	per	cent	or	1	per	cent	level.	Regarding	domestic	routes,	



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ELASTICITIES FOR THE DIFF-In-DIFF VARIABLE EVALuATED AT SAMPLE 
MEAnS 
OLS Random effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)








–0.3 –0.49 –0.38 –0.41 –0.38 –0.39
Domestic	routes
(N=20)
–0.39 –0.49 –0.39 –0.44 –0.31 –0.35
International	routes
(N=49)








the	merger	was	very	 intense.	 In	 the	period	after	 the	merger,	competition	between	
Vueling	and	other	airlines	operating	in	the	route	seems	to	be	softer	(regardless	the	
levels	of	concentration	or	the	share	of	Vueling	in	the	route).
















Overall,	 competition	 authorities	 should	 not	 be	 particularly	 concerned	 by	 the	
dynamics	 of	 the	 Spanish	 airline	market	 as	 airport	 constraints	 are	 not	 currently	 a	
major	entry	barrier	and	airlines	like	Ryanair,	Easyjet,	Air	Berlin	or	Norwegian	have	
an	increasing	presence	in	this	market.	Iberia	has	a	large	share	of	flights	in	Madrid	
airport	but	 inter-hub	competition	and	 the	 increasing	presence	of	 low-cost	 airlines	
and	high-speed	 train	services	are	weakening	 its	dominant	position.	Vueling	has	a	
strong	position	 in	Barcelona	airport	but	Ryanair	 (and	other	 low-cost	 carriers)	 are	
fearsome	rivals	for	this	airline.	
Intense	 competition	 in	 the	 airline	 segment	 contrasts	 with	 the	 monopoly	 of	
AENA	 in	 the	management	 of	 airports	 with	 commercial	 traffic	 (Bel	 and	 Fageda,	
2011;	Comisión	Nacional	 de	 los	Mercados	 y	 la	Competencia,	 2014).	The	 partial	
















What	 it	 seems	 is	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 airlines	 operating	 in	 the	 routes	 affected	
by	 the	merger	 is	 less	competitive	after	 than	before	 the	merger.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	
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